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Various terms have been used to describe the momentous events of 1989, including Jürgen 
Habermas’s ‘rectifying revolution,’ and my own notion of 1989 as a type of ‘anti-revolution’: 
repudiating not only what had come before, but also denying the political logic of communist power, 
as well as the emancipatory potential of revolutionary socialism in its entirety. In the event, while the 
negative agenda of 1989 has been fulfilled, it failed in the end to transcend the political logic of the 
systems that collapsed at that time. This paper explores the unfulfilled potential of 1989. Finally, 1989 
became more of a counter- rather than an anti-revolution, replicating in an inverted form the practices 
of the mature state socialist regimes. The paucity of institutional and intellectual innovation arising 
from 1989 is striking. The dominant motif was ‘returnism,’ the attempt to join an established 
enterprise rather than transforming it. Thus, 1989 can be seen as mimetic revolution, in the sense that 
it emulated systems that were not organically developed in the societies in which they were 
implanted. For Eastern Europe ‘returning’ to Europe appeared natural, but for Russia the civilizational 
challenge of post-communism was of an entirely different order. There could be no return, and instead 
of a linear transition outlined by the classic transitological literature, Russia’s post-communism 








Différents termes ont été utilisés pour décrire les événements fondamentaux qui se sont déroulés en 
1989, dont ceux de « révolution réctificatrice » de Jürgen Habermas, et mon propre concept 
définissant 1989 comme un type « d’anti-révolution » : rejetant non seulement ce qui c’était passé 
auparavant, 1989 a également constitué une négation de la logique politique du pouvoir communiste 
et du potentiel émancipateur du socialisme révolutionnaire dans son entièreté. En l’espèce, si l’agenda 
négatif de 1989 a bien été réalisé, il a échoué, à la fin, à transcender la logique politique des systèmes 
qui se sont alors effondrés. Cet article explore les potentialités inassouvies de 1989. Finalement, 1989 
est devenu plus une contre-révolution qu’une anti-révolution, reproduisant sous une forme inversée 
les pratiques des régimes ayant mis en place un socialisme d’État parvenu à un certain stade de 
maturité. Le manque d’innovation institutionnelle et intellectuelle survenue en 1989 est frappant. Le 
motif dominant était celui du « retournisme », une tentative de se joindre à une entreprise déjà établie 
plutôt que celle de transformer cette dernière. De cette façon, 1989 peut être vu comme une révolution 
mimétique, dans le sens où il a imité des systèmes qui ne s’étaient pas développés de façon organique 
au sein des sociétés dans lesquelles ces derniers s’implantaient. Pour l’Europe de l’Est, « revenir » à 
l’Europe est apparu comme naturel mais pour la Russie, ce défi civilisationnel que constituait le post-
communisme était d’un tout autre ordre. Il n’y avait pas de retour possible, et au lieu d’une transition 
linéaire mise en évidence par les recherches de la transitologie classique, la Russie post-communiste a 
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European history moves in roughly 30-year cycles, and 1989 joins the pantheon as one of those 
turning points that shape the continent. Like all other great inflexion points, from 1848 to 1968, as 
well as those marked by wars and peace congresses, the significance of the events is debated long 
after. The absence of a settled meaning and the capacity for endless reinterpretation may well be the 
characteristic that makes these events so important. This certainly applies to 1989, the moment when 
the bipolar security order that took shape in the late 1940s gave way to what was perceived to be a 
moment of European unification. It was also the moment when the long-term challenge of 
revolutionary socialism as an alternative modernity gave way to what was perceived at the time to be 
the victory of capitalist democracy, liberalism and the onset of the ‘end of history.’ Collectivist 
models of social emancipation gave way to the precedence of ‘negative freedom’ and the primacy of 
individual human rights. Sustained alternatives to capitalist democracy and the international order in 
which it was embedded were delegitimated. However, the collapse of the Soviet challenge and the 
victory of the Atlantic power system radicalized what came to be known as the ‘liberal international 
order,’ which effectively claimed to be synonymous with order itself. This resulted in a two-fold 
counter swing of the pendulum: rethinking forms of national and social solidarity, and a shift towards 
more pluralist (multipolar) forms of international politics. 
 
1989 against 1991   
 
Emphasis on the year 1989 already signals a temporal disjunction. As far as Russia is concerned, 1989 
is only part of the story. This is the part in which two major events came together. The first is the 
renunciation within Russia itself of the Leninist version of the revolutionary socialist challenge. This 
represented a powerful movement for self-transcendence. The last General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mikhail Gorbachev, came to power in 1985 and at 
first led a movement, which he dubbed perestroika (restructuring), to reform the Soviet model of 
socialism. His reform communism drew on the ideas of the Prague Spring of 1968, but soon became a 
movement for its transformation. By 1989 the instruments of Communist rule had been dismantled, 
and ‘reform communism’ gave way to post-communism (Outhwaite & Ray, 2004). The second 
process was putting an end to the Cold War. Through a long period of gestation in the various 
institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the New Political Thinking (NPT) rethought the 
structure of international relations, and came to the conclusion (perhaps prematurely) that the 
capitalist world is not necessarily militaristic and imperialistic (Gorbachev, 1987). This allowed 
Moscow to come to the conclusion that the Cold War was no longer worth fighting, and that the 
Soviet bloc was no longer worth defending. It was this that allowed the Berlin Wall to be dismantled 
and for ‘1989’ to take place (for an inside view, see Krenz, 2009). The narrative at the time was that 
this was a common victory of common sense, and only later was a triumphalist discourse of Western 
victory super-imposed on the earlier version; an imposition, understandably, never accepted by 
Moscow.  
For China, 1989 has a very different meaning. The occupation of Tiananmen Square by 
students and others demanding the continuation of the perestroika-type reforms pursued by Hu 
Yaobang (who died on 15 April 1989) was crushed on 4 June. Instead of the reform communism 
pursued by Gorbachev, China continued on the path of a ‘communism of reform,’ in which the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) put itself at the head of the country’s transformation while retaining 
the political superstructure of Party rule and all that this entailed. In an extraordinary repudiation of 
1989, the Chinese model of reform revalidated the leading role of a communist party, although in the 
end the ‘communism of reform’ generates contradictions of its own and may ultimately go the same 
way as reform communism (cf. McAdams, 2017). Hence the other part of the story is ‘1991.’ Soviet 
reform communism followed a very different trajectory, which by 1989 allowed the dissolution of the 
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communist system and the end of the Cold War, but which also by 1991 precipitated the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.  
As for Russia, 1991 has a number of overlapping meanings. First, it denotes Russia’s 
emergence as an independent state in borders that roughly correspond to those of European Russia in 
the sixteenth century, with still unresolved issues of identity and purpose. Second, Russia in 1991 also 
had its democratic revolution. The popular mobilization against the attempted coup in August brought 
a precipitous end to the remnants of Communist power and validated the democratic aspirations of the 
country. In March 1989 the Soviet Union was the first of the Soviet bloc countries to stage a relatively 
free election (White, 1991). This was intended to achieve an evolutionary transition to a democratic 
post-communism, unlike the East European elections held soon after which were designed to seal the 
rupture with the past (Travin, 2019: 7). The democratic aspirations of August 1991 remain one of the 
foundation stones of post-communist modernity, although they were poorly articulated and ultimately 
fused into the radical marketizing agenda of the neoliberal reformers (Reddaway & Glinski, 2001). 
Nevertheless, these aspirations largely shaped the December 1993 constitution, which remains the 
bedrock of the institutional development of the country. Third, it meant the end of empire for Russia 
itself. The rise of popular nationalism now took the form of a radical state and nation building 
exercise, accompanied by withdrawal from the former ‘colonies’ in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. Russia is still marked by a distinctive type of postcolonial syndrome, which feeds 
alternatives to constitutional democracy as the source of legitimation, notably various forms of 
‘Russian exceptionalism’ (for example, Orthodox nationalism). Fourth, a new way had to be found of 
interacting with the other 14 newly-independent states. The Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) was established in December 1991, but while for countries such as Ukraine it provided a 
mechanism for ‘civilised divorce,’ for many in Russia it was (and remains) the kernel of some sort of 
post-Soviet international community. Fifth, 1991 entails a fundamental geopolitical shift. The Cold 
War ended in 1989, but the democratic Russia that emerged in 1991 certainly did not consider itself a 
defeated power. Although greatly weakened economically and diminished in military power, Russia 
in status terms believed that it had scored a mighty victory in putting an end to the pointless 
confrontation with the West and believed that it could now become the co-creator of a transformed 
post-Cold War security order in Europe and a more cooperative international politics. Instead, 
narratives of failure and defeat were imposed onto 1991. After a quarter of a century of cold peace, 
the tensions thereby generated in 2014 provoked the onset of what some call a Second Cold War. 
Although 1989 and 1991 represent different appreciations of the meaning of the end of 
communism, they are closely linked, and the failures of the one provoked the contradictions and 
resentments of the other. Russia in 1991 sought to transform the historical West through Russia’s 
addition to make it a ‘greater West.’ The political West as it had taken shape after 1945 in the form of 
the Atlantic power system saw no reason for transformation, fearing normative dilution, institutional 
dysfunction and weakened hegemony, and instead advanced an increasingly ambitious program of 
expansion (Sakwa, 2017). The logic of transformation ran into the logic of expansion. In the end 1989 
was not ultimately transformative and only reproduced in new forms the expansive logic of the 
politics that it sought to overcome. Paradoxically, it was 1991 that provided the real opportunity for 
transformation, but in the end it was defeated by the agenda of 1989. And the agenda of 1989 was not 
only expansive in geopolitical terms, ideologically it represented the anti-collectivist and anti-utopian 
social program that had developed in the West since the 1970s, now radicalized by its perceived 
victory in 1989. This is not to deny the raised expectations of the participants of the anti-revolutions, 
who anticipated not only a social transformation but also a personal liberation (Vogt, 2004). 
 
The expansive dynamic of 1989 
 
Jürgen Habermas and others have stressed the imitative character of the 1989 revolutions, lodged in 
his characterization of modernity (for an assessment, see Arato, 1993). The absence of new ideas and 
institutions spawned by 1989 is remarkable. This sterility can be explained by the predominance of 
mimetic processes – the attempt to copy existing forms and to reproduce patterns of life devised 
elsewhere. That sterility is challenged by those who insist that a grand theory of 1989 can be devised 
(for an overview, see Mark, 2010). This retheorization focuses on a critique of 1989 as a failed 
moment of transformation (see Lawson, Armbruster & Cox, 2010; for a contrary view, see 
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Tismaneanu & Iacob, 2012). Stephen Kotkin famously argued that the communist collapse in East 
Europe, with the partial exception of Poland, represented little more than the implosion of a moribund 
and exhausted communist establishment (dubbed by him ‘uncivil society’), rather than the insurgency 
of a dynamic civil society (Kotkin & Gross, 2009). Kotkin thus deflates the rather grand but 
ultimately hollow theorizing of the time about civil society as the source of the dynamic renewal of 
democracy and society (cf. Kumar, 1992a; for a critique, see Killingsworth, 2012). 
This is why Ken Jowitt argued that the ‘Leninist extinction’ heralded an age of global 
turbulence, with unpredictable consequences (Jowitt, 1992). 1989 opened the door to geopolitical 
changes as profound as 1945, but it operated within the same logic, and thus in perverse ways 
perpetuated the logic of Yalta and Potsdam, although now without the balancing mechanisms in them 
that more or less kept the peace in Europe for 30 years. In these terms, 1989 was not such a ‘critical 
juncture,’ but the continuation of great power ‘overlay’ over Europe, although in new forms. The 
Atlantic power system and its instruments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and what 
became the European Union (EU), expanded into what it perceived to be a vacuum, but failed to take 
into the power consequences of its actions when it encountered an alternative culture in Eurasia, with 
its own power complex and manifestations of modernity. 
 Piotr Sztompka (1996) describes 1989 as ‘a cultural and civilisational break,’ but it is not 
clear what was broken – was it Russia or the past, or both? He talks in terms of the legacy of 
‘civilizational incompetence’ because of the impact of ‘bloc culture,’ but argued that it could be 
overcome by rejuvenating indigenous cultures but above all by adopting ‘globalised Western culture.’ 
This is the essence of the ideology of ‘returnism.’ The revisionist critique of 1989 would note the 
potential paths not taken – the idea of transformative politics mentioned earlier. The revisionist 
critique of 1989 is close to the classic sense of the word, arguing that 1989 led to de-differentiation 
and homogenization.  
The character and significance of 1989 remains contested. First, 1989 is central to the 
ideological and geopolitical character of the modern world. It has been called unfinished, unformed, 
rectifying or plain mistaken, but underlying all these is the sense that this was a revolution. However, 
its revolutionary character is of a specific sort. Joseph de Maistre (1994) argued that a counter-
revolution (‘contrary revolution’) operates within the same logical framework as a revolution, 
whereas an anti-revolution (‘the contrary of revolution’) in his view represented a repudiation of the 
earlier logic of power. 1989 had the potential to become an anti-revolution, but this would have 
entailed embracing a logic in which power relations and geopolitics would have been transformed. An 
anti-revolution would mean the repudiation not just of revolutionary socialist ideology, but the logic 
of political action on which it was based. This would entail a view of these revolutions as having a 
pouvoir constituent, a foundational dynamic that could have provided the political basis for a new 
conception of social order. Instead, these ‘postmodern revolutions’ presented themselves as 
revolutions ‘against the modern tradition of revolution’ (Arato, 1993: 624), and thereby became 
imitative rather than foundational.  
The dominant paradigm in the end became the expansion of the system against which the 
communist revolutions had originally been directed. This turned 1989 into a classic counter-
revolution. It operated according to the same logic as the thing that it opposed, but only with the 
opposite sign. This is vividly in evidence in the various museums of Soviet occupation and repression 
in Vilnius, Prague and elsewhere. These museums are as ideological as their Soviet predecessors, with 
little attempt to distinguish history from propaganda. The new emphasis on individual freedom and 
human rights was pursued with the same exclusive passion as earlier collectivist solutions had been 
imposed. The contradictions inherent in this counter-revolutionary militancy helped transform the 
regimes in Hungary and Poland into authoritarian simulacra of their socialist predecessors. There was 
no anti-revolutionary transformation but only counter-revolutionary returnist enlargement. This 
negative agenda was underpinned by the ideology of the ‘return to normality.’ In the late perestroika 
period in the Soviet Union even ideologically competing groups, ranging from neo-Marxist 
proponents of ‘socialism with a human face,’ to liberals and all the way through to Russian 
nationalists, joined the anti-revolutionary ‘conservative,’ a turn based not on empirical analysis of 
what was to be conserved and what was to be changed but on a utopian ‘natural-historical’ 
essentialism. Drawing on Alexandr Solzhenitsyn’s thinking, the various tendencies converged on the 
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idea that, purged of ideology, violence and political projects, society would bend back into a more 
‘normal’ congruence with human nature (Atnashev, 2017).  
 Second, the shadow of 1968 hangs over 1989, but in the end 1989 was as much directed 
against the ideology of 1968 as much as it was against the geopolitical settlement of 1945. For our 
purposes 1968 is associated with the idea of reform communism – the view that some more humane 
and dynamic socialism could be retrieved from the repressive Soviet-style state socialism. These ideas 
had already been advanced and partially implemented in Yugoslavia, but they were formulated most 
consistently in Czechoslovakia and gave rise to the Prague Spring’s attempts to formulate ‘socialism 
with a human face.’ This was crushed in the Soviet-led invasion of 21 August 1968. This was the 
greatest self-invasion in history since it not only crushed the specific experiment in democratic 
socialism in Czechoslovakia, but also doomed the Soviet Union to twenty years of stagnation. 
Independent initiatives in the workplace and political sphere were stifled, and sources of innovation 
suppressed. When 20 years later Gorbachev returned to the reform communism of 1968, it was too 
late. By the end Gorbachev was talking of a ‘humane, democratic socialism,’ as the draft Party 
Program put it in 1990. By then the populations in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and indeed in 
Russia, were no longer interested in democratic socialism; they wanted no socialism at all. The goal 
by then was not to reform socialism but to put an end to its perceived misery.  
This in the end meant dismantling not only Soviet socialism, but also much of social 
democracy. In a philosophical sense, 1989 emerged out of the failure of 1968 to create a dynamic 
reformed socialism. This opened the door to the imposition of linear models of transition, the 
mechanical transposition of socio-economic models to the new territories, largely operating within the 
framework of classic and largely discredited models of modernization. Transitology implied ‘a space-
time in which the liberal democratic present of the so-called West was posited as the future for the 
postsocialist states of the East.’ In the end, postsocialism came to mean the end of social democracy 
but in fact heralded the rise of neoliberal precarity (Graan, 2014). What had been the socialist world 
was ‘desocialised’ (Suny, 2017). As a result, the region became ‘the world’s last underachiever’ 
(Bajrektarevic, 2015). 
 This brings us to the third and most mimetic aspect: enlargement rather than transformation.  
Many ideas are associated with 1989 – civil society, the end of history, the return to Europe, even 
anti-politics – but they all fall within the compass of the enlargement of an already existing enterprise 
– Western capitalist modernity. 1989 was unable to devise a modernity of its own, or to shape its own 
history. However, by repudiating the past, East European countries sought to escape the bonds of their 
own history. In political and economic terms, this took the form of the enlargement of the EU, and in 
security terms the expansion of NATO. Together, this meant the enlargement of the Atlantic power 
system, which had been devised in specific historical circumstances of an earlier era, yet gained a new 
lease of life in very changed conditions. This generated tensions and contradictions that in the end 
provoked a return to conditions of Cold War, which had given birth to the Atlantic power system in 
the first place. The circle was complete, with 1989 representing no more than a pivot point as the arc 
bent back on itself. The logic and purpose of the Atlantic power system was not transformed. Instead 
it gained an expansive dynamic that transformed anti-revolutions into counter-revolutions, and thus in 
the end vitiated the logic of emancipation from revolution itself.  
 The fourth issue builds on the previous points. The dissolution of the socialist alternative 
followed soon after by the disintegration of the Soviet Union radicalized the historical West. The 
contradictions of the historical West only intensified (Kimmage, 2014). In the long perspective, we 
can now see that 1989 represented little more than a milestone in the consolidation of the hegemony 
of neoliberalism – or put more simply, the onset of a period of militant capitalism. Even the EU talked 
less of the ‘social market model,’ one of the major themes of the 1980s, and focused on regulating and 
stimulating a competitive market economy. Neoliberalism believes that markets are self-regulating 
and self-correcting, and that markets operate efficiently when the sphere of state activism and 
provision is reduced to the minimum. The rationale is not only economic but also political – by 
enlarging the sphere of market choice, personal autonomy and freedom are extended. To use the 
language of Karl Polanyi, the sphere of market relations is ‘disembedded’ from the larger socio-
economic system (cf Ruggie, 1982). The expansive logic of 1989 weakened embedded liberalism and 
intensified the neo-liberal reduction of citizens to consumers, while hollowing out the foundations of 
democratic citizenship.  
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 The rise of the neo-liberal form of capitalism was a long process, from the end of the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate system in 1971 towards the beginning of financial deregulation later that 
decade to the election of Margaret Thatcher in May 1979 and Ronald Reagan in November 1980. Eric 
Hobsbawm talked at the time of ‘the forward march of labour halted’ (Hobsbawm, 1978). Long 
before 1989 the foundations of the post-war social democratic consensus were being eroded. The 
process is described by Leo Panitch in his co-authored book The Making of Global Capitalism. As he 
notes in an associated article (2014): ‘For most of the 20th century, the word ‘reform’ was commonly 
associated with securing state protections against the chaotic effects of capitalist market competition. 
Today, it is most commonly used to the undoing of these protections.’ This is associated with the 
triumph of the ideology of globalization. The term was hardly mentioned before 1989, but at this time 
became the dominant ideology of the era. It is associated with state disempowerment (although ‘third 
way’ social democracy greatly enhanced the intrusive regulatory state), the homogenization of 
political space (although sociologists stress the elements of societal variation), the assertion of 
political conformity and the discrediting of alternatives. The result was open societies but closed 
political systems in which the range of acceptable alternatives was narrowed. 
 
1989 as a mimetic revolution 
 
This brings us to the fundamentally mimetic character of 1989 and the problem of Russian post-
communist modernity. One of the distinctive features of 1989 is the repudiation of the past and the 
attempt to transcend it by outlining a spatial project of the ‘return to Europe.’ This entails a 
repudiation of tradition and models of development rooted in the past. For a country such as Russia, 
this adds another level of disjunction between the programs of 1989 and 1991. There could be no 
‘return’ to a Europe which, since 1945, had gained layers of institutionalization from which Russia 
had been absent. Europe, moreover, had become embedded in an Atlantic power system that Russia, a 
major continental power with a vast Eurasian presence, by definition could not join as an equal, since 
that would disrupt the existing power hierarchy; but even less as a subaltern, since that in turn would 
disrupt Russia’s self-understanding as a great power operating on a global scale, however diminished 
it may have been in the immediate wake of the Soviet collapse.  
At the same time, imitation has always played a large part in the political imaginary of 
Russian modernization, although typically couched in terms of autochthonous development (Petro, 
1995). Since Peter the Great at the beginning of the eighteenth century, it has imitated Western 
models for technological and economic modernization, usually driven by the imperative of competing 
on equal terms with the European state system. Imitation is at the heart of any definition of the 
‘modern.’ As Habermas (1983: 4) notes, the term ‘appeared and reappeared exactly during those 
periods in Europe when the consciousness of a new epoch formed itself through a renewed 
relationship to the ancients – whenever, moreover, antiquity was considered a model to be recovered 
through some kind of imitation.’ Imitation is central to Western modernity, although typically 
couched in the language of tradition or the classical heritage (Turoma, 2017). Paradoxically, 
innovation typically comes from imitation, and thus the 1989 ‘revolutions’ restore the original 
meaning of the concept, denoting the circular momentum of historical time (Koselleck, 1985: 41–42 
and passim). Russia as the bearer of an alternative tradition is thus perceived as imitating Western 
modernity, accompanied by notions of falsehood and fakeness.  
The shift from the temporal (‘the shining heights of communism’) to spatial models of 
development (the ‘return to Europe’) means that the political time associated with the 1989 
revolutions is no longer rooted in the past and autonomous traditions (whether invented or not) but in 
a displaced present in which the country itself is on the move. And it is moving towards something 
already rooted in the lived experience of another world, but which it tries to copy nevertheless. This 
changes the quality of political relationships. Mimetic politics share an axiological disposition; that is, 
towards closing down debate and patterns of dialogical interaction (Sakwa, 2018). In political dialogism 
all the actors change as a result of their interactions, whereas dialectical politics is more linear (giving 
rise to transitology), historicist (claiming to know the meaning and purpose of history), and axiological. 
Axiological politics are based on a distinctive hermeneutics in which one interlocutor places themselves 
in a privileged position vis-à-vis the other. The autonomous political subjectivity of the other, in both 
domestic and international relations, is thereby denigrated. This is why diplomacy has degraded in the 
7 
 
post-communist era. The logic of expansion means that the ‘other’ is designated as little more than an 
‘us in waiting’; and if they refuse to fulfill this role, then they become a ‘malign actor’ and are 
demonized as such. This applies as much to EU–Russia relations (Prozorov, 2016) as to the great power 
relationship with the US (Cohen, 2018). This is manifested in many different ways, ranging from 
rhetorical violence and diplomatic exclusion to more subtle attitudes of ‘othering’ and ‘orientalization.’  
In the context of 1989, three types of mimetic politics can be identified: the mimetic scapegoat, 
adaptive mimesis, and mimetic simulacra. The mimetic scapegoat is the most basic and truest to the 
insights offered by René Girard. Scapegoating entails separation and is a way for a society (or an 
international community) to relieve tensions through the ritualized application of violence. Girard 
(2005) views the scapegoating principle as a universal phenomenon, although it takes many different 
forms (see also Girard & Freccero, 1989). The symbolic allocation of responsibility for social ills is 
ascribed to a particular object, which is then deprived of the most basic of rights, the right to life. In 
common parlance, a scapegoat is a mechanism to direct violence outwards, to find some external ‘other’ 
responsible for internal contradictions. In Girard’s conception, the violence has to be ‘forgotten,’ and the 
sacrificed object becomes sacred. Mimetic violence is cathartic and helps not just to displace anger, but 
above all reinforces the bonds of community and preserves existing hierarchies. The inherent rivalry and 
conflict within human society have deep anthropological roots, in which the mimetic nature of human 
relationships reproduces the values, customs and beliefs of a given order. Politics alone cannot resolve 
this violence but it is tempered by the sacral elements that sublimate the violence into religious, mythical 
and ideological forms. In his book of interviews, Battling to the End, Girard (2010) applies mimetic 
theory most fully to international affairs. He was less convinced than ever that politics could confront 
and resolve violence, and instead argued that even the struggle against violence only begets greater 
violence. This is a powerful description of how the foundations of the post-Cold War order generated 
resentment and violence when applied in the form of axiological virtue politics. 
Girard (1976: 4 and passim) argued that democracy is the most mimetic regime of all, since its 
essentially egalitarian principle means that every citizen is the model and rival to the others. Forms of 
mimetic desire are ‘internally mediated,’ where the distance between the subject and model is reduced 
or entirely removed, as compared to the social and other barriers to ‘undifferentiation’ in more 
traditional societies (notably, the gulf between the lord and serf, where neither is the model for the other, 
and therefore mostly not potential rivals) (see also Hodge, 2014: 31–43). In international society the old 
status hierarchies of the colonial era have been leveled to encompass some 200 states with formally 
equal status. In the European context, many of the recently ‘liberated’ East European states are the most 
vigorous in delegitimiting Russia’s security concerns, and in repelling any notion of ‘spheres of interest’ 
in the region. For them, America is so far above the rest that it cannot function as a mimetic rival, but as 
the distance with potential rivals closes, then mimetic hostility is generated. The scapegoating 
mechanism, of course, is unstable and prone to crisis, and thus contingency and elements of decisional 
leadership can change the dynamics. 
The didactic character of much Western policy vis-à-vis Russia is couched in terms of adaptive 
mimesis. This is embedded in the revived modernization framework and is also a type of violence in that 
it presumes a superiority that reinforces hegemonic structures of power. Autonomous political 
subjectivity is effectively diminished by engagement in ‘reform,’ a code word designating 
dissatisfaction with one’s own present and the attempt to adapt to some normative standards set outside 
one’s own historical or developmental experience. For Aristotle, mimesis is the way in which people 
learn, as a child copies the behavior of adults and thus is educated in the ways of adults. A child until a 
certain age is deprived of legal autonomy, and so it is by analogy with states, where political 
subjectivity, if not political sovereignty, is diminished. This, ultimately, is the epistemological 
foundation of democratization theory on which the post-Cold War literature on transitology is based. 
Russia has been locked in a form of catch-up modernization for generations, and the history of 
Russia’s engagement with Western modernity has been accompanied by traditionalist concerns that 
adaptive mimesis would lead Russia to lose some of its ‘authentic’ identity as it copied Western 
models of development and denigrated its own customs. Despite this, Russia for several centuries has 
been a prickly yet eager student, desperate for a learning that would confirm its place in the 
community of European civilized states. Since Peter the Great opened his ‘window to Europe’ the 
tension between Russia as an adept and as a master has never been overcome (Malia, 2000). In the 
eighteenth century, Russia considered itself a Northern power, and had the self-confidence to 
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challenge the earlier strategic balance in the region. However, when the axis of influence shifted to 
the East-West plane, Russia found itself at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the dynamic modernity that was 
taking shape in Western Europe. Today this takes the form of a struggle between Russia’s torn 
identity as the most Eastern of the Western powers, or as the most Western of the Eastern 
civilizations. The latter today takes the form of the ambitious but ill-defined Greater Eurasia 
Partnership (GEP), with Russia and China at its core.  
Viatcheslav Morozov calls Russia a ‘subaltern empire’: it is subaltern because its vision of 
modernity is ultimately derivative, generated by Europe, with whom it has traditionally had an 
ambivalent relationship; but its self-image as a great power perpetuates the imperial dimension, with 
profound consequences for its domestic and international policies. Because Russia has been 
Europeanized it cannot offer a vision of an alternative modernity; but it claims to be a more authentic 
version of that modernity to which it aspires (Morozov, 2015). This is the ‘true’ Europe that was 
already articulated in the nineteenth century (Neumann, 2016). The subaltern relationship means that 
the hegemonic social order does not allow Russia’s voice to be heard; but the imperial self-identity 
insists that its voice is heard, hence the endless tensions, crises and contradictions of our time 
(Morozov, 2015). This is a classic and perhaps quintessential mimetic relationship, where the object 
of desire is defined by the experience of the other. This helps explain the mimetic crisis in which 
Russia and Europe now find themselves. 
The ‘Bolshevik experiment’ (De Basily, 1938; Suny, 1998) was an attempt to achieve an 
emancipated version of Western modernity: seeking to transcend the contradictions while fulfilling 
the potential that the founding fathers of Soviet-type socialism recognized to lay within that 
modernity (Anderson, 2015). The Soviet experiment represented an attempt to create an alternative 
modernity to the degree that it differed from the practices of Western capitalism, but in the end failed 
to sustain itself as a coherent alternative social order (Arnason, 1993). This is the philosophical basis 
for Vladimir Putin repudiating the language of ‘reform’ when he came to power in 2000. He refused 
to accept that the template for Russia had been forged elsewhere. His repudiation of revolution and 
other-oriented reform was already outlined in his Russia at the Turn of the Millennium in December 
1999 (Putin, 2000). This reflected a profound feature of Russia’s self-identity: the belief that Russia 
could not borrow the history of others but had to fulfill its own destiny. 
The concept of ‘reform’ is now seen precisely as an expression of the subaltern relationship. 
Reform suggests adaptation to norms and practices generated elsewhere. In the Russian context, 
Putin’s strong antipathy to the term is reinforced by the painful experience of Gorbachev’s reforms, 
which in the end provoked the dissolution of the communist system and the disintegration of the 
country. The stress on ‘sovereign democracy,’ advanced above all by the Kremlin’s chief ideologist 
up to December 2011, Vladislav Surkov (2010), explicitly rejected adaptive mimesis, which was 
considered to have a violent element at its core, namely the destruction of Russia’s autochthonous 
traditions and the negation of its historical experience. The West set itself up as mentor, which could 
not but reduce the subjectivity of the learner (Prozorov, 2016). This helps to explain the 
uncomfortable connotations associated with the concept of ‘democracy’ in contemporary Russian 
political discourse. Like the notion of reform, it is associated with the ‘time of troubles’ in the 1990s 
and the loss of political subjectivity. At the same time, Russia can be considered an unruly pupil, 
lamenting its exclusion because of the EU’s hierarchical and administrative practices but at the same 
time excluding itself from Europe because of its great power identity, hence it oscillated between 
being ‘in and out of Europe’ (Prozorov, 2009).  
This brings us to the third form, mimetic simulacra. In typical circumstances of ‘democracy 
promotion,’ adaptive mimesis can be perceived as a form of tutelary violence. For Plato, mimesis is a 
form of copying, but it lacks the benign pedagogical impulse that is at the heart of the Aristotelian 
conception. Mimetic politics is what the West does when it says to the rest of the world that they must 
copy the West in order to move beyond their current state of infantilism (the Aristotelian version). The 
immanent goal may well be good governance, the rule of law and secure property rights, but these are 
embedded in an axiological culture of politics. From the Platonic perspective, mimetic politics lacks 
authenticity since it copies the form but lacks the substance. The revolt against universalizing 
discourses reflects an innate Platonic conception of mimesis as mere imitation and estrangement from 
truth and originality, and reinforces the search for a genuinely foundational Russian tradition in art 
and politics (Greenleaf & Golburt, 2009: 744–745). The mimetic introduction of the form at the 
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expense of the substance has allegedly produced a particularly lifeless form of politics. Dmitry 
Furman talked of ‘imitative democracy,’ in which the social institutions of democracy are imported, 
but in the absence of the appropriate socio-cultural life world (the appropriate political culture, elite 
dispositions and social structures), they become mere imitations of the institutions taken from the 
West (Furman, 2008). Simulacratic mimesis can only be challenged by a substantive reinvestment in 
politics and the political process. 
 What makes 1989 specifically mimetic? It certainly was a copying event, with almost nothing 
new devised as part of the process of change. It was copying through the ideology of returnism, 
although some pre-communist elements were also restored. Once the counter-revolutionary character 
of the change became clear, it was conducted ultimately within the dynamic of enlargement. Although 
the societies concerned were transformed, these changes were adaptive rather than innovative. But 
above all the Girardian mimetic process was at work: the copying of the desires of others provoked 
resentment and ultimately intense scapegoating. This enduring condition provoked tension with 
Russia and various ‘others,’ notably migrants; and this mimetic violence is the root cause of the 
renewal of a new type of Cold War. This includes mimetic rivalry between the EU and Russia, as twin 
putative great powers on the same continent, with overlapping and contesting normative ambitions. 
The process of imitation is not so much learning as a socialization into the norms of a given order. For 
Girard, violence is a phenomenon of mimetic contagion: in other words, mimesis triggers violence. 
Mimetic competition turns into mimetic rivalry when the object is not available to both (in our case, 
the post-Soviet territories and the status denoted to the order-makers). The mimesis of appropriateness 
and emulation leads to undifferentiation, and the actors – because of, and not despite the 
undifferentiation – perceive themselves as rivals.  
 
Enlargement and returnism 
 
1989 represented a radicalization of dialectical politics, reproducing linear, historicist and axiological 
narratives. In other words, 1989 not only tried to copy the model of modernity that appeared to have 
proven itself so successfull in the West. Paradoxically, to achieve the approximation of that modernity 
by entering into a politics of enlargement, in fact East Europe reproduced precisely that which it had 
putatively tried to overcome, a dialectical style of politics that assumes a certain singularity of 
outcomes. This was a new type of the monism that the revolutions had tried to overcome. The 
ideology of returnism represents a spatialized version of socialism’s traditional temporal striving to 
reach the horizon of human community. The temporal goal of communism can never be achieved 
(certainly when it is formulated in such linear terms); but what happens when a country reaches the 
horizon? The future in a temporal utopia can always be reinterpreted, but it is much harder to redefine 
the physical realities of a spatial utopia. When it is discovered that there is only more of the same 
‘over there,’ disillusionment inevitably sets in. This in turn provoked a return to what were considered 
native and authentic traditions, notably in Hungary under Viktor Orbán and the Poland shaped by the 
Kaczyński brothers (Davis & Slobodchikoff, 2018). 
Even more deleteriously, by confirming the triumph of the institutions of the historical West, 
the victory discourse of 1989 helped freeze political development in the West. The Atlantic 
institutions became ‘normalized’ as the new ‘standard of civilisation,’ the re-appropriation of a 
nineteenth century concept in the very different late twentieth conditions (Gong, 1984). The Central 
and East European states thereby self-orientalized themselves, and once again rendered themselves 
peripheral. Krastev notes how ‘the politics of ‘normalization’ replaced deliberation with imitation’ 
(Krastev, 2010: 117). He goes on to argue: ‘By declaring democracy the normal state of society and 
restricting democratization to an imitation of the institutions and practices of developed democracies, 
Central Europe’s ideology of normality failed to give rein to the creative tensions that do so much to 
supply democracy with its flexibility and endurance’ (Krastev, 2010: 118). From this perspective 
1989 and other modern revolutions can be seen as ‘negative,’ in the sense that although they retain a 
degree of ‘revolutionary energy’ they failed ‘to produce a genuine historical break or a long-term 
democratic engagement’ (Magun, 2013: 1). 1989 represented a ‘radical denial of the past’ as well as a 
‘denial of the denial,’ because essentially these were ‘revolutions against revolutions’ (Magun, 2013: 
2–3). Otherwise put, these were anti-revolutions, repudiating not only earlier specific revolutions but 
the logic of revolution more broadly. From this springs also a positivity, which in the case of 1991, is 
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‘an event to whose democratic desires and victories it is important to keep fidelity’ (Magun, 2013: 
13). 
Ayşe Zarakol (2011: 54–55) reframes the argument in terms of the way that ‘semi-sovereign’ 
states in the periphery internalized the standards of civilization and institutions of modernity drawn 
from the West. The adoption of these institutions purportedly brought them closer to the core. This 
nineteenth century idea of linear progress was revalidated after 1989, only to be questioned as its 
deleterious consequences emerged. Russian post-communism operates in a very different 
civilizational matrix. From the beginning, Russia refused to accept any notion of peripherality and 
insisted on its sovereignty (Kokoshin, 2006). While there remains a powerful constituency in Russia 
of the view that modernization entails Westernization, for the ruling elite modernization remains 
something distinct from the Atlantic power system. Russia, they insist, will modernize, but in its own 
way. The standard of civilization from this perspective could never be set in the West, and unlike 
Turkey in the interwar years (Zarakol, 2011) and Germany and Japan after 1945, Russia would not 
‘embrace defeat’ (cf. Dower, 2000) but would continue to insist that its path to modernity would be 
devised in Russia. This does not mean attempts to recreate an alternative modernity let alone to devise 
a new Sonderweg, but it does mean that adaptation to modernity would not take the form of 
subordination to the post-1945 Atlantic power system. Russia continues to argue in favor of 
transformation to create a greater West rather than the linear enlargement of the historical West. 
There were potential alternatives. Václav Havel, Alexander Solzhenitsyn and many of the 
best thinkers of the period not only talked of dialogue but understood that the word represented a 
different style of politics. Havel was one of the generations who defined a new form of ‘anti-politics’ 
after the crushing of the Prague Spring (Popescu, 2012). Dialogical politics represents an open-ended 
(pluralistic) style of politics in which all of the subjects involved change through their interactions. 
Political dialogism represents a substantive repudiation of the monism of dialectical politics, in which 
the outcome is assumed to be known, and instead outcomes are achieved through mutual 
transformation. This brings us to a second central characteristic, a different relationship with time and 
political temporality. There is a dialogue with the past, the present and the future, and thus the 
character of political temporality is more open-ended. There is less certainty and more 
experimentation. Instead, of course, the politics of the transition after 1989 was deterministic and 
rooted in a political temporality based on the enlargement of an existing, and clearly attractive, 
political enterprise. Its very attractiveness turned into a ‘fatal conceit’ to use Hayek’s term, and for 
prominent liberals such as John Rawls, Richard Rorty and even Habermas the triumph of late 
twentieth century liberalism was justified not because it had been theoretically, or even practically, 
validated, but because it had won the Cold War. Even when not specifically mentioned, the liberal 
historicism of ‘end of history’ thinking underlays this expansive discourse (Drolet & Williams, 2019: 
28). The pretensions of the ‘liberal delusion’ were punctured on the rocks of geopolitical and 
civilization contestation (Mearsheimer, 2018). 
Of all the thinkers of the period, Havel came closest to devising an original theory. He 
understood that both sides needed to change, but he generated no theory about how this could be 
achieved. In other words, he failed to move towards a genuinely dialogical position. He understood 
that democracy means dialogue, and to work it needs active participation of a citizenry. However, 
when it came to a dialogical transformative process on a continental scale, Havel and his compeers in 
fact closed things down. He repeated arguments about the ‘end of ideology,’ arguing ‘We are on the 
threshold of an era of globality, an era of open society, an era in which ideologies will be replaced by 
ideas’ (Havel, 1993: 128). Fine sentiments, but in this paradigm the West was established as the 
paradigm and paradise. This is far from dialogism and in fact represented a return to crude dialectical 
thinking. Worse, the striving of the ‘other Europe’ to return to a mythologized historical Europe only 
reinforced the predominance of the historical West (Rupnik, 1989), rather than transforming it to 
become a ‘greater West.’ Liminality became instrumental rather than transformative, and adaptation 
to an existing model rather than contributing to a common transformative endeavor dominated. 
Instead of reconciliation, a cult of victimhood was nurtured. Not surprisingly, by 1993 Havel became 
one of the cheerleaders for the enlargement of NATO, while arguing for the ‘self-transcendence’ of 
humanity (Havel, 1995). By then, the emancipatory drive of 1989 was reduced to little more than 
moving as far as possible from Moscow, and embracing the historical West, without in any way 
changing that West. This suited the neo-nationalist faction in Ukraine just fine, establishing various 
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institutes and programs to eradicate its communist (and Russian) past to move forward into the bright 
European future. The removal of Soviet reminders and the promotion of an ethnocentric, nationalistic 
narrative echoed the East European ideological pattern of the previous three decades (Kasianov, 
2019).  
 The dialectical politics of enlargement represented the homogenization of time and space. 
This intersection of time and space created a system that was remarkably hermetic – that is, closed to 
sources of innovation and change. Worse, it appeared that Cold War liberalism became the dominant 
form, with a certain closure to innovation and ideas coming from outside of its own tradition. This in 
practice was tempered in most post-communist countries by a continued commitment to social 
welfarism, accompanied sporadically by various ideologies of conservatism. Above all, if there was a 
center that was expanding, this means that there was a periphery to which the center expanded. This 
was not only acceptable to most East European countries, but actually welcomed. The clamor at the 
doors of the EU and NATO could not be ignored by Western leaders, and although Bill Clinton 
understood that enlargement entailed alienating Russia, he came to believe that the price was worth 
paying. Critics who argue that Russia has made too much of NATO enlargement have a point: the 
alliance is defensive and as currently constituted, represents no threat to Russia; and possibly even 
enhances Russian security by damping down potential conflicts between bloc members, and 
guaranteeing strategic coherence across over two dozen members. However, Russia could not accept 
peripherality, and thus status concerns as much as security issues determined its response to the 
advance of a formerly hostile alliance system to its borders. 
 The emphasis on enlargement at the expense of transformation in the end provoked what 
could be called ‘political involution’: the choking of sources of renewal and innovation (Burawoy, 
1996). Involution is when a life form stops evolving, often marked by signs of regression. This was 
most evident in the crisis of liberalism. For many in the post-communist world, liberalism appeared to 
reproduce the political practices of the former socialist systems by imposing solutions on to society 
rather than allowing society to generate solutions from within through a dialogical process. The 
problem could well be deeper. Before 1989 there may have been dual involution: of the ancient 
regime of Soviet-style socialism; and of the West which the countries aspired to join. The post-1989 
act of enlargement in the end only reinforced the elements of involution in the West, by ostensibly 
confirming their superiority through victory in the Cold War, but which in fact helped slow processes 
of adaptation and change. Understandably, at the time there was little impetus for change in the West, 
since the immediate crisis affected only the Eastern part of the continent, but ultimately ‘post-
communism’ is a syndrome and problem that affected not only countries that had formerly been 
communist (Sakwa, 1999). 
 This is seen most vividly in the ideology of ‘returnism’; with the ‘return to Europe’ presented 
as the dialectical unfolding of an ineluctable process that had been artificially impeded for so long by 
the imposition of Soviet power (Kumar, 1992b). The ideology of returnism is classically monist, 
presented as a linear and naturalistic process, but which shuts down more open-ended and plural 
visions of Europe. The return was not to a putatively continental Europe, one which works to achieve 
the greater European ideal of a common European home, but which takes the institutions of the 
Atlantic system (the EU and NATO) as the best representations of Europe. The return thereby 
becomes no more than the enlargement of the Atlantic system to encompass the forcibly separated 
wanderers, rather than a transformative project that takes advantage of the unique opportunity opened 
up by the fall of the Wall. This was literally a liminal moment – when the limes (the border between 
the Roman Empire and the Germanic tribes) was eradicated to create a new community which 
expanded that liminal space to encompass both sides of the former frontier (Thomassen, 2014). In this 
reading, the old border becomes the new center, and thus the peripheral is transcended. This really 
would have been the wall to end all walls. 
 Gorbachev envisaged that the common European home would be a house with many rooms, 
encouraging a diverse political ecology of different regime types and social forms. By 1991 the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union put an end to Gorbachev’s dream of a ‘renewed, humane’ 
socialism, his version of the earlier aspirations of the Prague Spring for ‘socialism with a human 
face.’ As we have seen, his reform communism reformed the Soviet Union out of existence. There is a 
deeper paradox at work here. Gorbachev imbibed some of his ideas through meeting Czechoslovak 
students when he was a student at Moscow State University between 1950 and 1955, and he 
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clandestinely visited the country in the mid-1960s. It was these ideas that helped precipitate the Soviet 
collapse in 1991. Stalin had extended the Soviet realm to encompass Eastern Europe after 1945, and it 
was now Eastern European ideas that destroyed the USSR. The circle was complete. 
There were also directly ideological challenges. By 1989 the American administration headed 
by George H. W. Bush feared that the dynamic Soviet leadership was gaining the intellectual 
initiative, and sought a way to regain the upper hand. They did this by formulating the concept of 
‘Europe whole and free’ (Engel, 2018). The idea was first presented by Bush in his speech in Mainz 
as early as 1989, and then repeated in subsequent speeches to Congress. Clearly, this is an attractive 
notion, but it is vitiated by being part of a rather cynical attempt to reassert geopolitical advantage by 
displacing the notion a common European home. It reinforced the notion of enlargement rather than 
transformation. The idea of Europe whole and free was at the center of the Charter of Paris adopted in 
November 1990, but amid the ringing declarations was a steely intent for the historic West to restore 
its hegemony over the processes of change unleashed by the 1989 revolutions. 
 In this context, returnism represents a type of involution. It reinforced a Europe embedded in 
the Atlantic power system rather than taking advantage of post-Cold War conditions to institutionalize 
new forms of pan-European continentalism. The failure of the EU to assume deep responsibility in 
partnership with Russia for European space left the running in security matters to NATO, with all of 
the subsequent deleterious consequences. The ideology of returnism became a one-way street that 
once again turned into a dead-end alley. The concept of ‘Europeanization’ (meaning adaptation to the 
norms of the EU) thus became a form of self-orientalization (Zarakol, 2011). To return in this context 
meant giving up the East to become part of the West. In this cosmology, Russia represents the Orient 
and all that is backward, despotic and regressive. However, embedded in the ideology of returnism is 
a paradox that would ultimately challenge the developmental premise on which it is based, namely 
that the return ultimately would become uncontrolled and would smuggle in the grievances and 
ressentiment accumulated over the ages. In the case of Poland, for example, in the guise of the 
Kaczyńskis’ Law and Justice Party (PiS), this meant taking revenge not only on the liberal wing of 
Solidarity, to whom they had lost out in the 1990s, as well as grievances related to war reparations as 




As with any social enterprise, the failure to change and innovate usually leads to stagnation, decline 
and potentially collapse. The alternative modernity advanced by the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, 
but this does not mean that Russia has given up on modifying Western modernity. Neither does it 
mean that Russia has once again become messianic. Its proposals today are transformative rather than 
revolutionary. These ideas may well be a way of using intellectual innovation as a way of enhancing 
status, but they are also posited as severely practical responses facing Europe and the world today. 
These ideas are rooted in the liminal period of 1989–1991, and suggest that a return to the possibilities 
embedded in that period may present a way out of the present impasse in European affairs. In other 
words, having failed to take advantage of an earlier inflexion moment in European affairs, a return to 
that moment is the only serious possibility of a way forwards. In other words, a new form of returnism 
is required – this time to revisit the potential of an earlier period (a temporal project), rather than the 
spatialized conception of a ‘return to Europe.’ The potential for transformation can be rediscovered 
when axiological and dialectical politics gives way to a new pan-continental dialogism. Then finally 
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